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ARRESTING A SUSPECT IN A THIRD
PARTY'S HOME: WHAT IS
REASONABLE?
Last term the Supreme Court in Payton v. New YorkI held that ab-
sent exigent circumstances, police officers may not make a nonconsen-
sual entry into a suspect's home without an arrest warrant to make a
routine felony arrest. The Court did not require officers in such circum-
stances also to obtain a search warrant.
2
In deciding the home arrest issue, the Court left open3 the question
of whether the fourth amendment 4 protects a third person by requiring
a search warrant for arrest of the suspect in the third person's home.
5 Of
course, this issue was in dispute long before its mention in Payton ,6 and
the courts have avoided the problem7 as often as they have groped for a
1 445 U.s. 573 (1980). For a discussion of the case, see Note, Fourth Amendment-Nonexigent
Home Arrest Entries, 71 J. CRIM. L. & C. 518 (1980).
2 445 U.S. at 576.
3 Id. at 583.
4 The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
5 For a pre-Payton discussion of arrests in the home, see Rotenberg & Ranzer, Searching for
the Person to be Seized, 35 OHio ST. L.J. 56, 65-71 (1974); Note, Warrantless Arrests in Homes.-
Another Crisisfor the Fourth Amendment, 7 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 94 (1978); Note, The Neglected
Fourth Amendment Problem in Arrest Entries, 23 STAN. L., REv. 995 (1971). See also Note, The
Constilutionality of Warrantless Home Arrests, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1558 (1978).
6 See Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 120 Mass. 190 (1876); Olmstead v. Shed, 13 Mass. 520
(1816); Monette v. Toney, 119 Miss. 846, 81 So. 593 (1919); McCaslin v. McCord, 116 Tenn.
693 (1906). "What requirements must be satisfied before policemen without a search warrant
may conduct a search of a third person's private home for a suspect for whom they have a
valid arrest warrant are unsettled." United States v. Cravero, 545 F.2d 406, 415 (5th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1100 (1977). Compare United States v. Williams, 612 F.2d 735 (3d
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1328 (1980), and Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau,
502 F.2d 914 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S 909 (1975), with United States v. Phillips, 593
F.2d 553 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 947 (1979). See Annot., 5 A.L.R. 263 (1920).
7 See, e.g., State v. Ragsdale, 381 So. 2d 492 (La. 1980); Commonwealth v. Wagner, 486
Pa. 548, 406 A.2d 1026 (1979). The Eighth Circuit avoided the question of whether the
fourth amendment requires a search warrant to arrest in a third party's home by deciding
that the minimum requirement is an arrest warrant and probable cause to believe that the
suspect is within, and then failing to find the requisite probable cause. Rice v. Wolff, 513
F.2d 1280 (8th Cir. 1975), aj'd sub nom. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). Federal law,
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solution.8 The dispute has centered on the conflict between the rights of
the third party to privacy in the home and the governmental interests in
conducting a search to arrest. Resolution of the issue9 will define the
parameters of an individual's right to privacy and freedom from intru-
sive home searches under the fourth amendment.
This comment argues that the fourth amendment commands that,
absent exigent circumstances, government officers must obtain both
search and arrest warrant determinations from a magistrate to make an
unconsented entry into a third party's home to arrest a suspect.' 0 The
analysis will develop three major propositions. First, courts that require
merely an arrest warrant and reasonable belief by the officer that the
suspect is within the third party's home ignore the historic distinction
between arrest and search warrants and the historic emphasis on impar-
tial determinations of probable cause. Second, the fourth amendment
requires that, unless the circumstances make it unreasonable to obtain a
warrant, the magistrate must determine that there is probable cause to
believe that the suspect has committed a crime and that the suspect is
within the third party's home. Third, on balance, the search warrant
requirement is reasonable because the factors militating in favor of re-
quiring a search warrant outweigh the government's interests in con-
ducting the search of a third party's home to arrest with only an arrest
warrant.
I. PROBLEMS WITH EXCEPTIONS TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
The Court has consistently followed the principle that "except in
certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property
however, seems to have partially resolved the question in favor of requiring only an arrest
warrant as sufficient to make an arrest in a private dwelling:
Whoever, being an officer, agent or employee of the United States ... engaged in the
enforcement of any law of the United States, searches any private dwelling ... without
a warrant directing such search. . . shall be fined. . . or imprisoned. . . .This section
shall not apply to any person -
(a) serving a warrant of arrest ....
18 U.S.C. § 2236 (1948).
8 See, e.g., United States v. Adams, 621 F.2d 41 (lst Cir. 1980); United States v.
Arboleda, No. 79-1278, slip op. at 3397 (2d Cir. June 9, 1980); Wallace v. King, 626 F.2d 1157
(4th Cir. 1980), petition for cert. filed, [1980] 28 GRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 4052.
9 The Supreme Court will consider what authority is necessary to enter a third party's
home to arrest a suspect in United States v. Gaultney, 606 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
grantedsub nom. Steagald v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 71 (1980).
10 This position is essentially that taken by the Fourth Circuit in Wallace v. King, 626
F.2d 1157. For discussion of the case, see notes 71-77 and accompanying text infra. The court
held that in order to enter the home of a third person to arrest someone named in an arrest
warrant, officers must have probable cause to believe the person named in the warrant is on
the premises of the third party, and an appropriate exception to the warrant requirement
must exist. 626 F.2d at 1161. The dissent reads this to require both an arrest and search
warrant absent one of the exceptions. Id at 1162 (Hall, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 72
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without proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized
by a valid search warrant."t" In spite of this long-standing presumption
favoring a warrant,' 2 some lower courts have permitted entry into a
third party's home to arrest a suspect without a search warrant.' 3 To
allow this, these courts usually create one of two exceptions to the war-
rant requirement. One authorizes entry when the officer has an arrest
warrant and reasonable belief that the suspect is within the third party's
home. 14 The second permits the officer to enter a third party's home to
arrest without a warrant when the officer has probable cause to believe
that the suspect committed a felony and when the officer has a reason-
able belief that the suspect is within the home.' 5 Neither of these excep-
tions adequately considers the differences between arrest and search
warrants or the historical societal value placed on an independent judi-
cial determination as to the officer's belief.
The most frequently accepted theory in the lower courts as to what
authority is necessary to enter a third party's home to arrest a suspect
has been that the fourth amendment requires only an arrest warrant
and reasonable belief by the officer that the suspect is within the third
person's home.'6 The common formulation of this theory adds no fur-
ther requirment of an appropriate exception to the warrant requirement
such as consent or exigent circumstances.'
7
The Supreme Court in Payton gave some support to the arrest war-
rant/reasonable belief exception as applied to the suspect's home.
While the issue of whether a search warrant is required was not squarely
presented in Payton,'8 the Court concluded in dictum that a search war-
rant was not essential to assuring the suspect's fourth amendment
"1 Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S 523, 529 (1967). See also Wy-
man v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 317 (1971).
12 See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 445 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
13 See notes 14-15 in fia.
14 See United States v. Gaultney, 606 F.2d at 544; United States v. Phillips, 593 F.2d at
557; United States v. Hammond, 585 F.2d 26, 28 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Harper, 550
F.2d 610, 613 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v. Cravero, 545 F.2d at 421 ; United States v.
James, 528 F.2d 999, 1017 (5th Cir. 1976); Rodriquez v. Jones, 473 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Brown, 467 F.2d 419, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d
197, 206 (4th Cir. 1966); Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 120 Mass. 190.
'5 Latimer v. United States, 415 F.2d 1288, 1289-90 (6th Cir. 1969); McCaslin v. McCord,
116 Tenn. at 707-08. But tee United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343, 1350 (9th Cir. 1978).
16 See note 14 supra.
'7 Wallace v. King, 626 F.2d at 1161. Note that the Third Circuit varied the exception by
holding that the requirement of an arrest warrant and probable cause that the suspect is
within applies even in cases of exigent circumstances. Fisher v. Volz, 496 F.2d 333, 341 (3d
Cir. 1974). Cf. United States v. McKinney, 379 F.2d 259, 263 (6th Cir. 1967) (arguing that
the issuance of an arrest warrant is itself an exceptional circumstance obviating the need for a
search warrant).
18 The issue in Payton was only whether an arrest warrant was necessary to enter a sus-
pect's home to arrest, not whether a search warrant was also required. 445 U.S. at 575.
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rights.1 9 Despite its recognition that a. search took place to make an
arrest, 20 the Court argued that the search to arrest with an arrest war-
rant and reasonable belief that the suspect is in his home would be "rea-
sonable" under the fourth amendment:
It is true that an arrest warrant requirement may afford less protection
than a search warrant requirement, but it will suffice to interpose the mag-
istrate's determination of probable cause between the zealous officer and
the citizen. If there is sufficient evidence of a citizen's participation in a
felony to persuade a judicial officer that his arrest is justified, it is constitu-
tionally reasonable to require him to open his doors to the officers of the
law. Thus, for fourth amendment purposes, an arrest warrant founded on
probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a
dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the sus-
pect is within.
2 1
Thus, the Court in dictum apparently laid the groundwork for an
exception to the warrant clause requirement that no warrant issue with-
out "particularly describing the place to be searched. '22 The basis for
this exception is the existence of an arrest warrant. The notion implicit
in this Payton dictum was explicitly stated by the Fifth Circuit in United
States v. Woods:2 3 "[T]he law recognizes that an entry to execute an ar-
rest warrant is an exception to the requirement of a search warrant to
intrude into a home."
24
After Payton's holding that an arrest warrant and reasonable belief
is sufficient to enter the suspect's home, the question is whether a similar
construction of the warrant requirement can be applied to a third
party's home.25 As applied to the third party home entry situation, the
19 Whether the Court reached its conclusion by finding that a search on arrest warrant
authority was reasonable by balancing the interests at stake or by finding that the magistrate
had essentially made the equivalent of a search warrant determination in issuing the arrest
warrant is not clear. Se id at 602-03. The argument that a magistrate, in issuing an arrest
warrant, implicitly authorizes the search of the home is discussed in note 38 and accompany-
ing text inia.
20 445 U.S. at 588 ("It is inherent in such an entry that a search for the suspect may be
required before he can be apprehended.").
21 Id. at 602-03.
22 See U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
23 560 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1977). Like Payton, this case involved an entry to execute an
arrest warrant in the arrestee's home.
24 Id at 665.
25 Payton is not dispositive of the question as the Court itself recognizes that the holding is
limited to entries into the suspect's home. 445 U.S. at 583. This is apparent in the lower
courts' subsequent confusion as to what is required under the fourth amendment when of-
ficers enter a third party's home to arrest. After Payton, three circuit courts split on the re-
quirements in a third party entry situation. In United States v. Adams, 621 F.2d 41, F.B.I.
agents entered the defendant's home without an arrest or search warrant in search of an
escaped convict, who was found hiding in a closet. Indicted for harboring a fugitive, Adams
moved to suppress the evidence of the seizure of the escaped felon. Adams' housekeeper sup-
plied police with the tip that the escaped felon would be at her apartment. At the suppres-
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arrest warrant/reasonable belief requirement is unacceptable.
The theory that an arrest warrant and reasonable belief justify the
search 26 of a third party's home for a suspect is problematic because it
ignores the distinction between arrest and search warrants.27 An arrest
sion hearing a magistrate found both probable cause and exigent circumstances. Id at 43.
The court found that the use of the seizure of the escaped convict as evidence against the
defendant could only be upheld upon a finding of exigent circumstances. Id. at 42. Placing
the burden to show exigency upon the government, the court refused to apply the Dorman v.
United States, 435 F.2d 385, 392-93 (D.C. Cir. 1970), factors (listed in text accompanying
note 116 in/a) to determine exigent circumstances as a strict checklist. "The ultimate test is
whether there is such a compelling necessity for immediate action as will not brook the delay
of obtaining a warrant." 621 F.2d at 44.
Finding no such exigency, the court suppressed the evidence on that basis without reach-
ing the question of whether a search or arrest warrant was required. Id at 44 n.7. The court
criticized the agents for not seeking an arrest warrant when they had known of the escape and
probable whereabouts for two weeks. The court in dicta implied that a search warrant was
surely in order:
There was no reason why either an arrest or search warrant could not have been ob-
tained during the afternoon or evening of [the day before arrest]. . . .We are incredu-
lous at the magistrate's finding that the agents might reasonably have assumed that a
magistrate or judge would not be available at 8:30 a.m. . . . There was no reason why
the apartment could not have been staked out . . . while the warrant was obtained.
Id at 44-45 (footnotes omitted).
Of course the Adams court could have found that the Pa/on requirement of an arrest
warrant would suffice, but instead said that the earlier ruling was not dispositive in the third
party situation. Id at 44 n.7. While refusing to hold that either kind of warrant is required,
the Adams court at least implied that a search warrant is preferred.
Compare the holdings in United States v. Arboleda, No. 79-1278, slip op., and Wallace
v. King, 626 F.2d 1157. See notes 27, 71-77 & accompanying text in/ra.
26 An entry to arrest in a third party's home, like the entry to arrest in the suspect's home,
constitutes fourth amendment activity. The test to determine what areas the fourth amend-
ment protects is that announced in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967): "[T]here is a
twofold requirement, first that a person have an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reason-
able.'" Id at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Despite its admonition that "the fourth amend-
ment protects people, not places," id at 351, the Court in Katz used the home as an example
of an area where a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). See also United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 422 (2d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 913 (1978).
In addition to recognizing that people have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their
homes, the courts have stated that a home entry is a search. In United States v. Woods, 560
F.2d 660, the court noted that " 'the arrest can only be effected if the subject is first found and
thus a search is a necessary factual pre-requisite to the possible arrest.'" Id at 666 (quoting
United States v. Cravero, 545 F.2d at 416). See also Rotenberg & Tanzer, 14ra note 5.
In Payton, the Court lent support to the theory that an entry to arrest entails a search
when it rejected the New York Court of Appeals' conclusion that there was a "substantial
difference" between police intrusion to search a home and police intrusion to arrest a resident:
"an entry to arrest and an entry to search for and seize property implicate the same interest in
preserving the privacy and the sanctity of the home, and justify the same level of constitu-
tional protection." 445 U.S. at 588. The Court further noted that "the two intrusions share
this fundamental characteristic: the breach of the entrance to an individual's home." Id. at
589.
27 A recent Second Circuit opinion provides the best example of minimization of the dif-
ference between the two warrants. In United States v. Arboleda, No. 79-1278, slip op., police
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warrant does not satisfy the fourth amendment's requirement that a
warrant "particularly describing the place to be searched" issue upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.2 8 Despite the fourth
amendment's general reference to "warrants," an arrest warrant cannot
be substituted for a search warrant because there is a difference between
the two types of warrants29 and the particular interests each protects.
According to caselaw, arrest warrants and search warrants require
a different determination by the magistrate. A search warrant reflects a
magistrate's determination that there is probable cause to believe that
the evidence sought will aid in apprehension or conviction, and it names
the particular place to be searched and things to be seized. 30 A search
warrant issues only upon a showing that there is probable cause to be-
lieve that the item sought is located on the premises for which the search
officers went to the defendant's apartment to apprehend his brother, Gilberto Arboleda, on a
homicide charge. An officer poised outside the apartment window on a ledge observed the
defendant throw a foil packet of cocaine out of the window. The officer then knocked on the
window, entered, and arrested the defendant as he dropped narcotics to the floor. After the
arrest, officers searched the apartment for the defendant's brother, whom they originally
came to arrest, and found other evidence of narcotics activity.
Noting that the record did not show whether an arrest warrant was obtained, the court
denied the defendant's motion to suppress saying: "Although there was no search warrant for
Arboleda's apartment the police officers were going to the apartment to arrest Gilberto, and if
they had an arrest warrant for Gilberto this would have the same legal e ect at a search warrant in
justifying entry into Arboleda's home to effect the arrest." Id at 3403-04 (emphasis added).
The Arboleda court declined to rule on the arrest warrant question because the defendant did
not meet its burden to produce evidence that he was arrested or searched without a warrant,
and therefore, the government was under no obligation to adduce evidence of a warrant for
the brother's arrest. The result of the decision is to require only an arrest warrant to enter a
third party's home.
28 See U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
29 The Ninth Circuit has argued that the fourth amendment makes no distinction be-
tween an arrest and search warrant. However, the court also said: "The warrant, whatever it
be called, must describe 'the place to be searched,' here apartment 544, and 'the persons or
things to be seized,' here Duveray [the suspect] and the parcels." United States v. Prescott,
581 F.2d at 1350. However, the court's description is not of an arrest warrant but of a search
warrant. Because the officer may not know that the suspect will be seized in a place, an arrest
warrant rarely names a place to be searched.
Support for the notion that an arrest warrant might serve the purposes of a search war-
rant in the third party entry situation can also be found in Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S.
238 (1979). In rejecting a claim that the Court should set forth procedures for electronic
surveillance, the Court said:
This view of the warrant clause parses too finely the interests protected by the fourth
amendment. Often in executing a warrant the police may find it necessary to interfere
with privacy rights not explicitly considered by the judge who issued the warrant. For
example, police executing an arrest warrant commonly find it necessary to enter the
suspect's home in order to take him into custody, and they thereby impinge on both
privacy and freedom of movement.
Id at 257-58. This statement is distinguishable from the third party situation in that it in-
volves a suspect's home.
30 Id. at 255.
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warrant is requested. 31 In contrast, as the court in Fisher v. Volz32 noted,
an arrest warrant indicates merely that an "officer has probable cause to
believe the suspect committed a crime; it affords no basis to believe that
the suspect is in some stranger's home." 33 The differences in the war-
rants are designed to maximize protection against the type of intrusion
the government is about to make: the search warrant protects against
unreasonable search of the home or seizure of property while the arrest
warrant protects against unreasonable seizures of the person.
Search and arrest warrants differ not only because different judicial
determinations are involved, but also because the use of an arrest war-
rant to justify a search would violate the fourth amendment's command
for particularity. The Fifth Circuit drew the opposite conclusion in
Cravero v. United S/ates ,34 arguing that a search warrant is not required to
execute an arrest warrant in a third person's home because the arrest
warrant already particularizes the search.
35
The Cravero analysis fails to consider two problems. First, the par-
ticularity clause in the fourth amendment applies not only to "the per-
son or thing to be seized" (which an arrest warrant describes), but also
to the "place to be searched" (which arrest warrants traditionally do not
describe). To the extent that the arrest warrant does not name the place
to be searched for the suspect, it is general rather than particular. Sec-
ond, a routine search for a suspect can take on the characteristics of a
search under a general warrant because the plain view and search inci-
dent to arrest doctrines expand the scope of the search.36 This expan-
sion should be avoided by the adoption of a rule like that suggested in
the United States v. Bqyer concurrence whereby a search uncovering items
31 Rice v. Wolff, 513 F.2d at 1285.
32 496 F.2d at 333.
33 Ad at 341.
34 545 F.2d at 421 n.1.
35 But see the assertion by the Harper court that arrest warrants put few or no limitations
on the power of police to enter a private home. United States v. Harper, 550 F.2d at 613.
The same cannot be said of search warrants.
36 The importance of a magistrate's delineation of the scope of the search was emphasized
by the Court in Katz: "[B]ypassing a neutral predetermination of the scope of a search leaves
individuals secure from fourth amendment violations 'only in the discretion of the police.'"
389 U.S. at 358-59.
The Fisher . Polz discussion of the claim that the lack of a search warrant will transform
the arrest warrant into a "general warrant" is not necessarily inconsistent with this line of
argument. See 496 F.2d at 343. In Fisher, the police had an arrest warrant, probable cause,
and exigent circumstances. A rule that in exigent circumstances a search warrant is not neces-
sary does not preclude an argument that in nonexigent circumstances a search warrant is
required because an arrest warrant alone would operate as a general warrant. The Fisher
discussion of the general warrant claim should be read to apply only when exigent circum-
stances are present. With that reading, its rule would be consistent with that in Wallace v.
King, 626 F.2d at 1157.
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resulting in the arrest of the third party rather than the suspect would
be unreasonable and the evidence suppressed.
37
In addition to these differences in judicial determination, the two
warrants cannot be treated as interchangeable as search warrant deter-
minations are not made when an arrest warrant issues. In the context of
any entry into the suspect's home, the Payton Court argued that the
magistrate implicitly considers the privacy rights of the suspect when
issuing an arrest warrant by logically assuming that the officers will go
to the arrestee's home first to make the arrest. 38 Regardless of whether
this principle could withstand scrutiny in the suspect home entry situa-
tion, it certainly would not apply to the third party home entry. Under
current warrant practices, the magistrate makes no determination that
the suspect might be at a friend's or relative's home. Even if the magis-
trate implicitly considers that an arrest warrant could be executed in any
home, that consideration does not have the same kind of particularity as
an implicit determination that a suspect will be arrested in his own
home. The latter determination is limited to the residence of a named
person, while the former is a limitless inclusion of every residence with-
out any determination as to a particular person's residence. Therefore,
in contrast to the arrestee home entry situation, the third party's right to
be free from unreasonable searches is not considered implicitly or other-
wise when the magistrate issues the arrest warrant for the suspect.
Arrest and search warrants are also not interchangeable because
different authorities may actually issue the warrants. While in theory
one would expect a neutral magistrate to issue both kinds of warrants, in
practice the arrest warrant may not be issued by a magistrate. Professor
LaFave has observed that "in practice it is the prosecutor or his assistant
who is actually consulted by the police officer." In some cases "a judi-
cial officer does not enter the picture at any point."'39 LaFave's research
on the warrant systems in three states indicates that, at least for some
states, in everyday police practice the prosecutor makes the decision to
arrest and the warrant is signed as a mere formality.4° LaFave explains
37 United States v. Boyer, 574 F.2d 950, 955 (8th Cir. 1978) (Ross, J., concurring). Apart
from this discussion, Judge Ross' solution to the problem is inadequate because the homeown-
er's expectation of privacy is still violated when the search is made pursuant to an arrest.
warrant, even though the evidence against him is suppressed. That is, a determination by a
magistrate as to the belief that the suspect is in his home has still not been made. Further-
more, such a rule would create evidentiary and enforcement problems for police due to the
suppression of evidence which could easily be solved by obtaining a search warrant.
38 See 445 U.S. at 603.
39 W. LAFAvE, ARREST: THE DEcISI6N TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 31 (1965).
40 Id at 33. "Often the warrant is signed without any examination of its contents. The
reason for complete abdication of control was explained simply by one judge: 'I have com-
plete confidence in the police and prosecutor's office.'" Id at 34 (footnote omitted).
The Supreme Court tacitly accepted this practice in Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S.
300 [Vol. 72
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that the reason for this procedure is that arrest warrants are infrequently
issued, and a separate process similar to the charging function has not
developed. LaFave's findings probably may be projected to other states
because prior to Payton under caselaw an officer rarely had to obtain an
arrest warrant.4 1 This practice may change as officers seek more arrest
warrants to make arrests in the suspect's home in compliance with Pay-
ton. However, a change in the dominant role prosecutors play in the
issuance of arrest warrants is not assured.
Though such a procedure is objectionable in any case because it
circumvents the historic emphasis on impartiality,42 it is particularly so
when the arrest warrant will be the basis for a search of someone's home.
A prosecutor is not a "disinterested observer," and his decision to issue
an arrest warrant is based more on the likelihood of prosecution than it
is on "a meticulous testing of the evidence against the probable cause
norm" 43 envisioned by the framers. While the prosecutor will usually
issue warrants only for those suspects who can be successfully prose-
cuted, the potential for prosecution and the existence of probable cause
will not always be equivalent at the time the prosecutor decides to seek a
warrant. Furthermore, the probability of successful prosecution is not
the standard for seizure set forth in the amendment.
Because the decision to issue an arrest warrant comes from those
charged with enforcement of laws, issuance of an arrest warrant does not
represent the same degree of objective, impartial decisionmaking as does
issuance of a search warrant. The search warrant is supported by an
affidavit stating the officer's reason to believe that the suspect is in the
third person's home. In practice, entry upon an arrest warrant and a
police officer's reasonable belief that the suspect is within leaves citizens
with scant protection of their fourth amendment rights.44
In addition to this failure to distinguish appropriately between ar-
rest and search warrants, a second problem with the arrest war-
rant/reasonable belief approach is that it ignores the rationale behind
the distinction between probable cause and reasonable belief. The lit-
91 (1914), when the Court refused to invalidate a statute allowing the prosecuting attorney to
make the probable cause determination. "[Tihe function of determining that probable cause
.*.xists for the arrest of a person accused is only quasi-judicial, and not such that, because of its
nature, it must necessarily be confided to a strictly judicial officer or tribunal." Id at 100.
41 The practice, which was affirmed by the Court in United States v. Watson, was for
officers to arrest in a public place without an arrest warrant. 423 U.S. 411. Before Pa ton
officers usually arrested in the home without an arrest warrant on their own determination of
probable cause. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. at 607-09 (White, J., dissenting).
42 See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
43 W. LAFAVE, supra note 39, at 36.
44 One could argue that requiring a search warrant to arrest in the home might result in a
similar practice as to issuance ofsearch warrants. This is unlikely as the procedure for issuing
search warrants is already intact.
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eral language of the fourth amendment requires that an officer have
probable cause, not a reasonable belief, to conduct a search or seizure.
While probable cause is defined in terms of reasonableness, 45 the differ-
ent terminology is usually associated with who makes the determination.
In United States v. Cravero, the court said:
Probable cause is essentially a concept of reasonableness, but it has become
a term of art in that it must always be determined by a magistrate unless
exigent circumstances excuse a search warrant. When one says "probable
cause," therefore, one also says either "magistrate" or "exigent circum-
stances." Reasonable belief embodies the same standard of reasonableness
but allows the officer. . . to determine that the suspect is probably within
certain premises without an additional trip to the magistrate and without
exigent circumstances.
46
Furthermore, in Dunaway .New York, 47 the Court recognized that prob-
able cause is a higher standard than the reasonable suspicion standard.
Refusing to allow officers to take someone into custody on the basis of
reasonable suspicion, the Court noted that: "Hostility to seizures based
on mere suspicion was a prime motivation for the adoption of the
Fourth Amendment, and decisions immediately after its adoption af-
firmed that 'common rumor or report, suspicion, or even strong reason
to suspect was not adequate to support a warrant for arrest.' ",48 In al-
lowing an entry on reasonable belief instead of the constitutionally man-
dated probable cause, the courts essentially require a lower standard of
proof.
Later judicial review of the sufficiency of the officer's reasonable
belief does not adequately protect individual rights. As the Court noted
in Beck v. Ohio,49 "the after-the-event justification for the arrest or search
is a far less reliable procedure than an objective predetermination of
probable cause because it is influenced by the shortcomings of hindsight
judgment." The fact that injustice might be discovered after the dam-
age is done does not make it any less desirable to prevent it when possi-
ble through prior judicial review.
Reliance upon an arrest warrant and the officer's reasonable belief
that the person is on the premises also contravenes the fourth amend-
ment's historical preference for determination of probable cause by a
magistrate. The most notable statement of the need for such a determi-
45 See, e.g., Green v. United States, 289 F. 236, 238 (8th Cir. 1923): "Probable cause which
will justify an arrest is reasonable belief or suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in his belief that the person accused is guilty
of the offense of which he is suspected."
46 545 F.2d at 421.
47 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
48 Id at 213.
49 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964).
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nation was by Justice Jackson in Johnson v. United States: 0
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zeal-
ous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual
inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection con-
sists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached
magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often com-
petitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.... When the right of privacy
must reasonably yield to the right to search is, as a rule, to be decided by a
judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent.51
The requirement developed to protect citizens, not to punish law of-
ficers. The need to protect basic fourth amendment rights is so great
that the judgment of police as to probable cause is sufficient authoriza-
tion for a search only in exigent circumstances.
52
A magistrate's review of a police officer's belief as to whether the
suspect is in the home is no less essential in a search of a third party
home to arrest a suspect than in other search situations.53 As contrasted
with an entry into a suspect's home,54 an entry into a third party's home
involves the interests of a person not suspected of a crime. Because the
police do not have reason to believe that the third party is guilty of
wrongdoing, the third party whose home is subjected to a search for a
suspect is similar to a homeowner whose house is subjected to a search
for evidence. Like the homeowner in an evidence search, the third party
in a suspect search has a right to a determination by someone not
charged with ferreting out crime that an invasion of the third party's
right to enjoy the privacy of the home is necessary.
When compared to an entry to arrest in a suspect's home, "the in-
trusion onto a third party's property would seem to be a more possible
fourth amendment infringement. '55 When the fourth amendment
50 333 U.S. 10.
51 Id at 13-14 (footnotes omitted). See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 357; Mc-
Donald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948); Rice v. Wolff, 513 F.2d at 1286;
Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d at 389.
52 Rice v. Wolff, 513 F.2d at 1287. See also Paper v. United States, 53 F.2d 184, 185 (4th
Cir. 1931).
53 "The sanctity of the home is no less threatened when the object of police entry is the
seizure of a person, rather than a thing. A magistrate's disinterested determination that gov-
ernmental intrusion is warranted is no less desirable when the policeman's quarry is a suspect,
rather than a piece of evidence." United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d at 1349.
54 The Payton Court is errant at least to the extent that its decision rests on the assumption
that only the suspect's fourth amendment rights are at stake when officers enter the suspect's
home to make an arrest. Even in the entry of a suspect's home there are potentially third
party privacy interests at stake. That is, a suspect may live with a family or spouse whose
privacy interests must be considered separately via a search warrant inquiry. To base their
fourth amendment right to privacy on the notion that they are "one" with the suspect contra-
venes the Constitution's guarantee of individual liberty.
55 United States v. Woods, 560 F.2d at 666.
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stakes are high,56 as here, the detached judgment of a magistrate is es-
sential.5 7 There is nothing unique about a search to arrest a person in a
third party's home which makes judicial determination of probable
cause unnecessary.
Allowing officers to make probable cause determinations on their
own to enter a home might seem reasonable if society was assured that
police officers somehow exercise better and more honest judgment in
entries to arrest in a third party's home than in entries to seize evidence.
However, cases such as Lankford v. Gelston,58 in which over three hundred
homes were searched by police officers, indicate that a mistake of judg-
ment could just as easily be made in this kind of entry as in any other
where a magistrate's prior approval is required. Furthermore, some po-
lice officers apparently have failed to adopt the judiciary's reverence for
the right to privacy in the home. In one case an officer testified that in
twenty-six years on the police force he had never secured a search war-
rant.59 Since "history shows that police acting on their own cannot be
trusted,"60 a magistrate's prior approval of a home search must be re-
quired to enforce the policy of the fourth amendment.
6 1
A second exception to the general search warrant requirement sug-
gested by the courts allows an officer to enter a third party's home to
conduct a warrantless arrest upon the officer's reasonable belief that the
suspect, whom the officer has probable cause to believe committed a
felony, is within the home.62 The theory was more prevalent prior to the
Payon decision, and seems to have little constitutional support after Pay-
ton. The position would, however, not necessarily be logically untenable
in light of Payton if the Court believed that a third party had less fourth
amendment protection in his home than a suspect did in his own home,
56 But see statements to the effect that an arrest is usually considered more burdensome
than the "annoyance and temporary inconvenience" attendant to a search. United States v.
Watson, 423 U.S. at 428; Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 776 (1969) (White, J., dissent-
ing).
57 Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975).
5a 364 F.2d 197. The search was conducted over 19 days to find two black men who shot
and killed a police officer.
59 Fisher v. Volz, 496 F.2d at 337, 344.
60 McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. at 456.
61 This type of reasoning has been applied to other fourth amendment questions. Rice v.
Wolff, 513 F.2d at 1286, in rejecting the claim that an inadequate affidavit can be rehabili-
tated in a suppression hearing following the search, held the suggestion that in the absence of
exigent circumstances the police should be permitted to conduct searches on their own assess-
ment of probable cause to be contrary to the policies to be furthered by the warrant require-
ment. This approach "in no way would protect innocent citizens from unreasonable searches
by police officers who had erred in assessing the existence of probable cause to search the
particular premises." Id That a third party home search is for purposes of arrest should not
affect the societal refusal to rely upon an officer's assessment of probable cause.
62 See Latimer v. United States, 415 F.2d at 1290.
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and that the suspect had less fourth amendment protection in the third
party's home than in his own.
63
The probable cause/reasonable belief exception suffers the same in-
firmities as the arrest warrant/reasonable belief exception, but to a
greater degree. The theory provides less protection for the third party's
rights via a prior judicial ruling on the officer's suspicion than its stricter
counterpart discussed above. The theory is mentioned here only for
completeness, as it has little if any merit in light of the Payton ruling that
at least an arrest warrant is required.
II. THE COMMAND OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Having addressed the historic importance of independent judicial
review of police decisions and the importance of what determinations lie
behind the issuance of a particular kind of warrant, the next question
for consideration is what the fourth amendment requires for an entry to
arrest in the third person's home. The answer is best found by looking
to the literal language of the amendment.
What the language of the fourth amendment requires may be
clouded more than it is clarified by the use of labels to describe what
must be decided in advance by a judicial officer. Although the terms
"arrest warrant" and "search warrant" provide easy labels for purposes
of understanding and discussing the rule, much of the semantic debate
over arrest and search warrants could be resolved by simply setting
forth, without labels, what judicial determinations need to be made in
order to enter a third party's home to arrest a suspect. Because the basis
for the entry is the arrest, the magistrate should determine whether the
police have probable cause to believe that the suspect committed a
crime, much as the magistrate determines in issuing a warrant for a
thing whether the thing sought is evidence of the crime. This require-
ment fulfills the amendment's command that "no warrants . . issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and partic-
ularly describing. . . the persons . . . to be seized."64 The magistrate
should also decide whether there is probable cause to believe that the
suspect is on the premises of the third party. This requirement fulfills
the fourth amendment provision that the warrant, issued on probable
cause "particularly describ[e] the place to be searched. '65 The officer's
63 See Olmstead v. Shed, 13 Mass. at 522 (suggesting that visitors in a home would have
less protection against arrest than family members and servants). Cf. People v. Tillery, 99
Cal. App. 3d 975, 978, 160 Cal. Rptr. 650, 652 (1980): "The expectation of privacy, against
police intrusions, of an invited guest in a home should be as great as that of the resident
himself." ee also United States v. Williams, 612 F.2d at 738.
64 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
65 Id The Court has recognized that "the language of the Fourth Amendment, that'...
1981]
COMMENTS
reasonable belief combined with an arrest warrant should only be suffi-
cient authority for entry into a third party's home when one of the ex-
ceptions 66 to the search warrant requirement, such as exigent
circumstances or consent to enter, is present. 6 7 It is evident from the
framers' use of "and" rather than "or" as a connector that both the
person to be seized and place to be searched must be named in the war-
rant.
Issuance of a search warrant alone could, in some circumstances, be
sufficient authority for a third party home entry under this rule. The
issue of whether the equivalent of a search warrant supports an entry to
arrest in the suspect's home arose in a recent case interpreting Payton.
The court suggested that a search warrant could replace an arrest war-
rant to arrest a suspect in his own home. In State v. Ruth ,68 police who
had probable cause to believe that the defendant had committed felony
murder obtained a search warrant. In the process of executing the
search, police discovered the defendant in the apartment and arrested
him. The defendant claimed that the absence of an arrest warrant
made the arrest illegal. Deciding that the arrest was valid, the court
held that where the police enter a home for the purpose of conducting a
search under a valid search warrant, they may arrest a resident within if
they have probable cause to believe he committed a felony.69 Citing
Payton, the Connecticut Supreme Court reasoned that the search war-
rant met Payton's requirement for a judicial determination of probable
cause, and once legally on the premises, the police had a right to arrest
based on the plain view doctrine. The court argued that it would be a
"fruitless exercise" for police to obtain another warrant authorizing ar-
rest.
Although it is unclear from the Ruth reasoning exactly what deter-
mination the magistrate made in issuing that search warrant, presuma-
bly the issuance of a search warrant to enter a third party's home to
arrest necessitates a determination by the magistrate that there is proba-
ble cause to believe the suspect committed a crime and that the suspect
is within the home. Otherwise, there would be no basis for the search.
This is analogous to the determination before a search for evidence that
no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause. . .' of course applies to arrest as well as
search warrants." Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 485-86 (1958).
66 One court has suggested that the issuance of an arrest warrant might itself be an excep-
tion to the search warrant requirement: "[T]he law recognizes that an entry to execute an
arrest warrant is an exception to the requirement of a search warrant to intrude into a home."
United States v. Woods, 560 F.2d at 665. See also Wallace v. King, 626 F.2d at 1162 (Hall, J.,
dissenting).
67 See Wallace v. King, 626 F.2d at 1161.
68 41 CONN. L.J., June 10, 1980, at 14 (Conn. 1980).
69 Id at 16.
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the thing sought is evidence of a crime and that the thing is on the
premises.70 Thus, a search warrant would, if both determinations were
made, support an entry into a third party's home to arrest a suspect
since both essential determinations were made by the magistrate.
Even though a search warrant may suffice, the necessity for an ar-
rest warrant remains. In reality, officers probably will first develop a
belief that the suspect committed a crime, and sometime later, develop a
belief as to the suspect's whereabouts. Since the arrest warrant seems to
be sufficient to arrest on the suspect's premises under Payton, the officer
would naturally want to get the arrest warrant as soon as the belief that
the suspect committed a crime develops. To enter a third party's home,
however, the officer would have to obtain a search warrant naming the
place to be searched and person to be seized. The only time the search
warrant alone would suffice is when the two beliefs as to the commission
of the offense and the suspect's location develop simultaneously.
Thus, under the literal language of the fourth amendment, no mat-
ter what the warrant is called, a magistrate must make the equivalent of
both arrest and search warrant determinations before officers may enter
a third party's home in nonexigent circumstances to arrest a suspect.
This rule is preferable not only because it avoids the problems inherent
in the two theories rejected above, but also because it best comports with
the letter and spirit of the fourth amendment.
Some lower courts have advocated this formulation of the warrant
requirement. In Wallace v. King,7 1 the court supported a rule requiring
both arrest and search warrant determinations. This case was brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 198372 to question an unwritten police policy author-
izing officers to search any place without a search warrant when they
had a reasonable belief that the person named in the arrest warrant
would be there. The police had an arrest warrant for Susan Swain in a
child custody matter. Proceeding on the estranged husband's suggestion
that Swain was at her parents' home, police searched it without a search
warrant or circumstances requiring immediate arrest. One month later
Swain's estranged husband again contacted police, saying that she was
on the premises of a friend. When police searched the home for Swain,
their reply to the owner's objection to the warrantless search was that
the arrest warrant sufficed.
Although the court refused to hold the officers liable for damages
70 See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967).
71 626 F.2d 1157.
72 "Every person who, under color of any statute. . . subjects . . . any citizen of the
United States or other person. . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action by
law. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
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because they acted in good faith on the basis of instructions from superi-
ors, the court set forth a stricter standard for third party home entries
than that set forth for entry of a suspect's home in Pay/on. Essentially
adopting the plaintiffs' claim that searches based on a reasonable belief
that a person named in an arrest warrant might be found in the third
party's home contravene the particularity requirement of the fourth
amendment, the court said:
Reasonable or probable cause to believe that a person for whom an arrest
warrant has been issued is on the premises, standing alone, is not sufficient.
Although Payton held that an arrest warrant requires that a suspect 'open
his doors to the officers of the law,' that holding was specifically limited to
the 'dwelling in which the suspect lives.'. . . An arrest warrant indicates
only that there is probable cause to believe that the suspect committed a
crime; it affords no basis to believe that the suspect is in a stranger's
home.
73
While the Wallace court does not explicitly call for a search warrant,7 4
its test requires more than did its predecessors: "[N]ot only must the
officers have probable cause to believe that the person named in the
arrest warrant is on the premises of the third person, but there must also
exist an appropriate exception to the warrant requirement" such as con-
sent or exigent circumstances.7 5 The court went even further and re-
quired an analysis of several factors, some of which include: whether a
magistrate is available, whether an officer can stake out the premises
while another gets a search warrant, the nature of the premises to be
entered, and the reasonableness of the belief.76 Thus, Wallace vitiates
the previous talismanic quality of the entry standard premised upon the
"reasonable belief that the suspect is within" by making that standard
merely one of several factors to determine what authority is necessary to
validate a search to arrest in a third person's home.
77
With the exception of the recent Wallace v. King opinion, the
caselaw provides only scattered support for a search and arrest warrant
requirement. The reluctance of the courts to establish a search warrant
requirement in the absence of specific Supreme Court guidance is indi-
73 626 F.2d at 1161.
74 Judge Hall writing in dissent interprets the majority as requiring a search warrant. Id
at 1162.
75 Id at 1161.
76 Id
77 The Wallace standard can be criticized because it does not provide a "bright line" for
guidance to police officers, who must juggle these factors in their heads as they decide
whether to enter and arrest. The criticism loses its salience, however, to the extent that the
exigent circumstances exception would save an officer from going through mental fourth
amendment gymnastics in a true emergency. Otherwise, the officer should be forced to care-
fully consider the reasons for the substantial invasion of privacy involved in an entry of a
third person's home.
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cated by their willingness to support the theory in dicta but not in a
holding, as well as their adroitness in evading the question.
In McDonald v. United States,78 for example, a case involving the en-
try of a rooming house without arrest or search warrant to arrest a sus-
pect after officers saw evidence of a numbers operation from outside the
house, the Court refused to "assume that where a defendant has been
under surveillance for months, no search warrant could have been ob-
tained. ' 79 Resting upon the need to protect the individual's privacy, the
Court said: "When we move to the scene of the crime, the reason for the
absence of a search warrant is even less obvious. When the officers...
saw what was transpiring in the room, they certainly had adequate
grounds for seeking a search warrant." 80
In Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 81 the court discussed the
search warrant requirement. Pursuant to arrest warrants issued for
three suspects in an armed robbery, the police searched buildings clus-
tered together and arrested the suspects. While implicitly supporting a
search warrant requirement in dicta,82 the court essentially adopted the
Firher v. Volz rule by holding that exigent circumstances validated the
warrantless unconsented search: "Although police have warrants for the
arrest of suspects, they may enter premises, at least of third persons, to
search for these suspects only in exigent circumstances where the police
officers also have probable cause to believe that the suspects may be
within."18 3 In spite of the holding of Gereau, the Ninth Circuit has cited
the case for the proposition that a search warrant, not just an arrest
warrant, is required when officers seek a suspect in a third party's
home.
8 4
The Eighth Circuit artfully avoided making a decision on the ques-
tion in Rice v. Wof.8 5 After an arrest warrant issued for a bombing
suspect, police entered the home of the suspect's friend (Rice) upon a
search warrant and found dynamite in plain view. Once the court
found that the search warrant was invalid because the affidavit was in-
sufficient to establish probable cause, the question of whether the arrest
warrant was sufficient to validate the entry was squarely before the
court. Instead of reaching the question, the court said that "the fourth
78 335 U.S. 457.
79 Id at 454-55.
80 Id at 455. Note, however, that Jackson's concurrence implies that an arrest warrant
may have justified the entry. Id at 459.
81 502 F.2d 914.
82 "Arrest warrants are not substitutes for search warrants." Id at 928.
83 Id
84 United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d at 1349-50. See also United States v. Adams, 621
F.2d at 44 n.7 (citing Gereau for that proposition).
85 513 F.2d 1280.
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amendment mandates, as a minimum, that police officers may not enter
the dwelling or premises of a third person in search of a suspect for
whom they have a valid arrest warrant unless they have reasonable or
probable cause to believe that the suspect is within. '8 6 Because the po-
lice acted only upon a hunch or guess, they failed to show a "firm, con-
crete, and otherwise reasonable belief' constituting probable cause.
8 7
The case supports search warrant protections to the extent that the
court refused to validate the entry on the grounds of exigency and to the
extent that it left open the question of whether the police or a magistrate
shall determine whether the officers have a reasonable belief that the
suspect is within.18
Finally, in United States v. Williams ,89 police entered a third party's
home with neither an arrest nor a search warrant upon an informer's tip
to arrest Williams, a shooting suspect. Finding that the protection
against warrantless arrests in private dwellings extends to one who is in
the dwelling of a third party,90 the Third Circuit nevertheless held that
exigent circumstances justified the entry to arrest. 91 The court's discus-
sion of whether the police had sufficient time to obtain a warrant lends
support to a search warrant requirement in nonexigent circumstances. 92
The halting steps of these courts toward requiring both arrest and
search warrant determinations in third party home entry situations sup-
port the idea that more is at stake in the third party entry situation than
in the entry into the suspect's home. In Wallace v. King the court ac-
cepted the proposition alluded to in Gereau, Wof, and Williams, holding
that in the absence of a search warrant, officers must have both proba-
ble cause to believe the person named in the arrest warrant is on the
premises of the third person and an appropriate exception to the war-
rant requirement. 93
This rule appropriately allocates the determinations as to arrest
and search to the judiciary. By allowing the judicial officer to determine
whether the suspect has committed a crime, the rule protects the third
86 Id at 1292 (emphasis added). See also Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d at 203.
87 513 F.2d at 1292.
88 The "firm, concrete" language could also be read to establish an intermediate standard
requiring more than the usual "reasonable belief" but less than a determination of probable
cause by a magistrate.
89 612 F.2d 735.
90 Id at 738.
91 Id at 739.
92 Id Another case often cited as supporting a search warrant requirement is United
States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 424 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 913 (1978). Reed re-
quires that for an arrest in a suspect's home absent exigent circumstances officers must have
"a warrant to arrest a suspect at home," ie., a search warrant. See United States v. Arboleda,
No. 79-1278, slip op.
93 626 F.2d at 1161.
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party from intrusions into privacy based on less than probable cause for
arrest. Likewise, the search warrant requirement protects the third
party from an arbitrary entry based on the officer's suspicion that the
suspect might be inside. A rule not assuring judicial determination on
both questions would leave a huge loophole, allowing officers to use
their decisions on whichever question has been left to their judgment as
a basis for the entry. Such a rule provides feeble protection for third
persons in their homes. In contrast, the rule in Wallace recognizes the
special protection afforded the home under the fourth amendment and
essentially adopts the literal language of the fourth amendment.
III. BALANCING THE INTERESTS
As the presumption under the fourth amendment is that warrant-
less searches of private property are generally unreasonable,94 the bur-
den must be on the one desiring to create a general exception to show
that requiring a warrant is unreasonable or that creating an exception is
reasonable.95 The analysis behind creating an exception or upholding
the requirement is essentially the same.96 As established in Camara v.
Municipal Court of San Francisco,97 the Court balances "the need to search
against the invasion which the search entails."98 Using the balancing
approach, the Court has carved out a few narrow exceptions to the war-
rant requirement by finding a particular type of fourth amendment ac-
tivity to be reasonable.9 9 The practical impact of these exceptions is
either that officers may search ° ° or seize' 0 1 without a warrant, or that
they may do so with less than probable cause.' 0 2 Likewise, the Court
has upheld the requirement for a warrant by showing that it is not un-
94 See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S.
541,543 (1967).
95 United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. at 445; Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 528.
96 See, e.g., the Court's analysis in Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, a welfare home visit
case, where the factors were balanced to show an exception would not be unreasonable. One
of the arguments was that a search warrant requirement would be unreasonable because it
would frustrate the purpose of the AFDC program.
97 387 U.S. 523.
98 Id at 537. For another application of the balancing approach, see Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. I.
99 Some of the traditionally recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement include
search incident to arrest, United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Chimel v. Califor-
nia, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); consent, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); plain
view, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971); and stop and frisk, Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
100 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.
101 United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. at 414.
102 Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. at 320.
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reasonable.10 3 Reasonableness is the ultimate standard. 104
Some of the factors the Court has considered in applying the bal-
ancing test are: the protection of police officers and citizens, 0 5 the in-
trusiveness of the search,'0 6 the occupation of the person conducting the
search,' 0 7 the individual's right to privacy, 10 8 the successful prosecution
of a crime, 10 9 and the purpose of the search." 0 Usually no one factor is
determinative of the reasonableness issue. The Court balances many of
these interests, attempting to maximize both individual rights and the
government's concern for successful law enforcement.
To determine whether the proposed requirement of both arrest and
search warrant determinations by a magistrate is "unreasonable," the
need for the intrusion into the third party's home to arrest a suspect
must be balanced against the invasion which such a search entails for
the third party. Of course, general societal interests exist on both sides
of the balance between governmental concerns and the individual's in-
terests.
It is necessary "first to focus upon the governmental interest which
allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected
interest of the private citizen.""' The most compelling government in-
terest is the apprehension of criminals as safely and efficiently as possi-
ble.' 1 2 The fact that one must engage in balancing indicates that the
challenged fourth amendment requirement somewhat burdens the en-
forcement interest."13 The question is not whether the requirement is
burdensome at all, but whether it is unduly burdensome.'"
4
The government's goal of criminal apprehension is more likely to
103 See, e.g., id at 311-15, where the Court upholds the search warrant requirement for an
OSHA inspection.
104 Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. at 539.
i05 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 27.
106 Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. at 321; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 24-25.
107 Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. at 322-23.
108 Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. at 311-12; Camara v. Municipal Court of San
Francisco, 387 U.S. at 528.
109 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 22.
11o Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. at 323.
111 Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. at 534-35.
112 Terry v. Ohio recognized this interest as "effective crime prevention and detection."
392 U.S. at 22.
113 Fourth amendment requirements do not inherently frustrate law enforcement. While
there is conflicting evidence as to their practical impact, these restrictions may well enhance
society's law enforcement goal by forcing police officers to do more thorough investigative
work and not waste limited resources pursuing persons on whom there is insufficient evidence.
An important indirect benefit, moreover, is to instill greater faith and cooperation in citizens
who realize that the officers are carrying forth their duties in a responsible and restrained
manner.
114 See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. at 445 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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be delayed than frustrated' 1 5 by a search and arrest warrant require-
ment. The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement,
which would allow the officer to enter the third party's home to arrest
upon a reasonable belief that the suspect is within, provides officers with
a range of activity that need not be approved by a magistrate in emer-
gency situations. In deciding whether the situation is an exigent one,
the officer would consider the factors suggested in Dorman v. United
States 116: seriousness of the offense, reasonable belief that the suspect is
armed, probable cause and reasonably trustworthy information that the
suspect committed a crime, likelihood of escape, and peaceable nature
of the entry. Additional considerations for the officer would be those
enumerated in Wallace v. King: hot pursuit, 1 7 fear of injury to others if
the arrest is delayed, availability of a magistrate, and ability of police to
keep watch while a search warrant is obtained."i8 Conversely, a passage
of time between the officer's belief that the suspect is within and the
actual entry would militate against a finding of exigent circum-
stances." 19 Similarly, a prior formalized .strategy to execute entry by po-
lice would be a factor indicating that a search warrant should have been
sought.12
0
In situations where a suspect flees into a private home, as con-
trasted with a flight in ja public area, a finding of exigent circumstances
would generally be less likely since the suspect is confined to one place.
The suspect's potential mobility is much more restricted, particularly if
officers have staked out the residence. 121 A situation which might qual-
ify as exigency and thereby not require a search warrant would be
where a violent crime is committed late at night, one or two officers
respond, and the suspect is seen fleeing into a nearby building armed.
115 Camara suggests that "[i]n assessing whether the public interest demands creation of a
general exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, the question is not
whether the public interest justifies the type of search in question, but whether the authority
to search should be evidenced by a warrant, which in turn depends in part upon whether the
burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the
search." Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 365 U.S. at 533.
116 435 F.2d at 392-93.
117 This factor has been recognized by the Supreme Court. United States v. Santana, 427
U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976). See, e.g., People v. Bradford, 28 Cal. App. 3d 695, 104 Cal. Rptr. 852
(1972).
118 626 F.2d at 1161. Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau suggests that the factors should be
reasonable grounds to believe the suspect will not tarry long, commission of a grave offense,
and a heavily armed suspect. 502 F.2d at 928.
119 An example ofwhat should not be exigent circumstances under this rule is found in the
facts of United States v. Boyer, where surveillance went on for two hours before the entry.
574 F.2d at 952. See also United States v. Robertson, 606 F.2d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 1979) (two-
hour delay).
120 See, e.g., the facts of Smith v. United States, 254 F.2d 751 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
121 United States v. Adams, 621 F.2d at 44-45.
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This is typically described as "hot pursuit."' 122 Grave endangerment of
the officers' lives or the lives of others would be a factor to consider in
such situations.
123
The exigent circumstances exception thus provides flexibility,
within the fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
searches, and assures that the government's purpose of criminal appre-
hension is not frustrated. The exception would provide officers with the
tools necessary to capture armed and dangerous criminals in someone's
home without a search warrant when the emergency demands instant
action.
In applying the exigency exception, however, officers must remem-
ber that it is not the general rule. Officers must still adhere to the rule
that "police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial ap-
proval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure."' 124 The
presumption should always be in favor of seeking the warrant, with the
burden on the state 125 to show that, on balance, circumstances were exi-
gent and that police did everything in their power to make the entry
upon authority of a valid search warrant. Formulating a strict standard
as to what comprises an exigent circumstance is necessary, because any-
thing but a narrow definition would make the search warrant require-
ment an empty promise.'
26
Putting aside the concern about apprehension of criminals, the re-
maining burden on the state of the search warrant requirement is the
delay in obtaining a warrant. In nonexigent circumstances the signifi-
cance of the delay diminishes, as immediate apprehension is not impera-
tive. In most cases the officer would already have obtained an arrest
122 "[R]easonableness without a warrant is adjudged solely by the extremity of the circum-
stances of the moment and not by the general characteristics of the officer or his mission. If
an officer is pursuing a felon who runs into a house and hides, the officer may follow and
arrest him. But this is because under the exigencies of the circumstance the law of pursuit
supersedes the rule as to search. . . . [E]xcept for the most urgent of necessities, the question
of reasonableness is for a magistrate and not for the enforcement officer." District of Colum-
bia v. Little, 178 F.2d at 16 (D.C. Cir. 1949), aj'd, 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
123 See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. at 298-99.
124 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 20.
125 "Terms like 'exigent circumstances' .. are useful in underscoring the heavy burden
on the police to show that there was a need that could not brook the delay incident to ob-.
taining a warrant .. " Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d at 392. See also United States v.
Williams, 612 F.2d at 739.
126 Some have suggested that the issuance of an arrest warrant constitutes exigent circum-
stances. United States v. McKinney, 379 F.2d at 263. Even if such a rule were applied only
to arrest warrants issued for felonies, it would be too broad and would have no direct correla-
tion with the violence of the crime or dangerousness of the criminal. Many crimes which
were not classified as felonies at common law are assigned that label today, and the determi-
nation that a crime is a felony is related more to the punishment than to the nature of the
offense. See, Note, Justiyaable Use of Dead Force by the Police: A Statutory Suv , 12 Wm. &
MARY L. REv. 67, 71 (1970).
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warrant under Paton to search for the suspect in his own home and
would have ample time to obtain a search warrant after his belief as to
the suspect's presence in the third person's home developed. If the of-
ficer feared that the suspect might leave the home, a guard could be
posted outside the home to arrest the suspect in public if he did flee the
residence. Should the two suspicions as to commission of the crime and
whereabouts of the suspect develop simultaneously, only one trip to the
magistrate would be necessary because both determinations could be
presented to the magistrate at the same time.127 One trip to the magis-
trate is no more than the Court required in Payton.
Thus, in most cases the result will be a relatively minor delay in
obtaining the proper entrance authorization, resulting in a correspond-
ingly slight increase in police resources expended, not the escape of the
criminal. This minimal delay and extra expenditure is the burden on
the enforcement goal which must be balanced with the individual's in-
terests.
Another significant factor on the governmental side of the balance
is the interest in protecting citizens in their homes from dangerous sus-
pects. Presumably if a third party feared the suspect, he would consent
to a police entry for purposes of arresting the suspect. Voluntary con-
sent is a well-established exception to the search warrant require-
ment.128 When the suspect enters the home against the party's wishes,
however, the peril is likely to be so immediate that police could not ob-
tain consent. The most common example is of the armed and dangerous
suspect fleeing into the third party's home after committing a crime.
Just as the exigent circumstances exception helps the officer to prevent
escape of the suspect, so does it help the officer to enter a residence
quickly to protect the citizen.
Another consideration is whether the danger to police officers in
carrying out their duty is increased by the warrant requirement in the
third party home entry situation. "Certainly it would be unreasonable
to require that police officers take unnecessary risks in the performance
of their duties."' 129 In theory, the officer would be endangered if ob-
taining a warrant gave the suspect extra time to arm himself in the
home. The notion that the suspect would have more time is based on
the assumption that the suspect knows the officer has gone to get a war-
rant. In most nonexigent circumstances cases, however, a period of time
127 See text accompanying notes 64-71 supra concerning when a search warrant is sufficient
authority to enter a third person's home to arrest a suspect.
128 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1972). Whether the suspect could
complain of the entry when the third party consents poses a standing question beyond the
scope of this comment.
129 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 23.
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passes after the arrest warrant issues, during which the officer develops
probable cause as to whereabouts, gets a search warrant, and goes to the
home. The suspect would not know the officer had gone to get a search
warrant, and would likely be just as surprised when the officer knocked
on the door with a search warrant as when he knocked on the door with
only an arrest warrant. When the crime is a nonviolent one, such as a
white collar crime, the danger of the suspect arming himself rarely ex-
ists. While the effect of a warrant requirement on police safety is diffi-
cult to predict, it is certainly not as substantial as the Court found it to
be in the stop and frisk 30 or public arrest situations, 131 where the officer
has not confined the suspect to the areas or may not know what crime, if
any, has been committed.
Finally, the proposed warrant requirement could burden judicial
calendars. Because the procedure of acquiring a search warrant is in-
tact, the burden on judicial officers would be the consideration of more
requests for warrants rather than the creation of a new procedure.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has frequently warned that fourth
amendment rights do not rise and fall in accordance with the enforce-
ment problems their protection might pose. 132 In Payton, for example,
the Court rejected claims that an arrest warrant requirement must fall
in the face of practical considerations, saying that "such arguments of
policy must give way to a constitutional command that we consider to
be unequivocal."' 33 If the Constitution requires a search warrant, the
marginal increase in judicial resources to meet additional warrant re-
quests cannot provide the basis for finding the warrant requirement un-
reasonable.
On the other side of the balance, the nature and quality of the in-
trusion on individual rights must be examined. The fourth amendment
rights at issue are those of the third party. 134 The most compelling third
party interest is the right to privacy in the home. This privacy is one of
130 Id at 24.
131 See generally United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411.
132 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. at 15. There the Court suggested that inconve-
nience for the police and slight delay are not good enough reasons to bypass constitutional
requirements.
133 445 U.S. at 602.
134 For purposes of determining whose rights are at stake, a question which arises is
whether the suspect is in his own or a third party's residence. The difficulties in applying a
search warrant requirement for a third party home entry but not for a suspect home entry are
illustrated by United States v. Arboleda, No. 79-1278, slip op. The case involved the arrest of
the defendant at his brother's apartment. The Second Circuit did not discuss the question of
whether this was a search of a third person's home, which could have been in doubt if the two
brothers shared the same apartment. The court seemed to assume, however, that it was a
third party home entry. Id at 3404 n.5 (referring to decisions on entry into a third party's
residence). The distinction between the third party's and suspect's home also might be un-
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the primary rights protected by the fourth amendment.135 "The basic
premise of the prohibition against searches was . . . the common law
right of a man to privacy in his home, a right which is one of the indis-
pensable ultimate essentials of our concept of civilization . . . .[I]t be-
longed to all men, not merely criminals, real or suspected."' 3 6 The
Supreme Court has said that "the fourth amendment, and the personal
rights which it secures, have a long history. At the very core stands the
right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion."' 37 The phrase "every man's
house is his castle," commonly used to support the proposition today,
became doctrine in the famed Semayne-s Case'38 nearly four hundred
clear when the suspect is at his parent's home or when the suspect maintains several resi-
dences.
Of course, the rights of third persons present in the suspect's home (spouses, children)
should not turn on the fact that they happen to live with someone for whom an arrest warrant
has been issued. Although the best solution to these problems would be to require both types
of warrants regardless of whose residence it is, the fact that Paon requires a different stan-
dard to enter the suspect's home than is advocated here to enter a third party's home necessi-
tates setting forth a definition of the term. A third party's residence could be defined as one
which the suspect does not own or live in a majority of the time.
The attempt to define the third party home illustrates why distinguishing between a
suspect's home and a third party's home as a basis for a warrant requirement is a fruitless
exercise. One reason is that the line may be difficult for police officers to draw when, for
example, the suspect lives with a friend with or without maintaining a separate residence.
Another is that it is tenuous to base the surpec6 fourth amendment rights on what may be a
distinction without a difference. If a suspect lives with her brother and her brother is consid-
ered a third party, both an arrest and search warrant would be required to arrest her in the
residence. However, if the brother is not considered a third party because the suspect lives at
the residence that they share, only an arrest warrant and reasonable belief would be required
under Pa.yton.
135 Many judicial statements emphasize that the home merits special protection under the
fourth amendment. In United States v. Williams, 612 F.2d at 738, the court said: "In our
constitutional jurisprudence no subject has been so jealously protected from intrusion or
seizure as the private dwelling place." After Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 351, stated
that the fourth amendment protects "people not places," the Ninth Circuit underscored the
importance of the home in fourth amendment law:
[T]he amendment itself gives special emphasis to the protection of people in their
houses. The singling out of "houses" suggests that the draftsmen were especially anxious
to safeguard "the sanctities of a man's home and the privacies of life." This is consistent
with the emphasis placed upon the sanctity of the home in England immediately before
the revolution . ...
United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d at 1348 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630
(1886)). In United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972), the Court
reiterated that "physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the
fourth amendment is directed."
For other statements of the principle, see Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511
(1961); United States v. Cravero, 545 F.2d at 415; Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d at 389;
District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d at 16.
136 District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d at 16-17.
137 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. at 511.
138 11 Eng. Rul. Cas. 628, 630 (1604). ("The house of everyone is to him as his castle and




While the right to privacy in the home intuitively seems to belong
to the people, articulation of exactly what that right means is elusive.
Those attempting to elucidate the right to privacy have variously de-
fined it as the right to satisfy intellectual and emotional needs in the
privacy of the home, 13 9 the right to free association in the marriage rela-
tionship, 140 and the right to be left alone. 14 1 The third party's privacy
right which is infringed upon when police enter to arrest is no different
than that infringed upon when a search for evidence is conducted. The
invasion consists of the embarrassment and humiliation of having an
officer of the state come into the house; the exposure of a person's life-
style to outsiders; the invasion of personal affairs which are intended to
be left confidential; the invasion by the government of the one place
where a person can go beyond which the eyes of others may not follow.
In short, these invasions violate the right to retreat to the home without
fear of unreasonable intrusion. "It is not the breaking of his doors, and
the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense;
but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, per-
sonal liberty and private property ....
Although the anguish of the third party during the search is not
reduced by issuance of a search warrant instead of an arrest warrant,
society has historically found the privacy right inherent in the security of
one's home to be so important that it has refused to rely on the judg-
ment of police officers alone to intrude upon that right. The purpose of
the entry to arrest someone does not diminish the value placed on pri-
vacy in the home. The affront to the citizen is the same whether the
purpose of the search is to seize evidence or to seize a person.'
43
William Pitt's famous admonition against entry into the home by the King quoted in United
States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d at 1349. The notion that one's "castle" could not be invaded
actually applied only to civil service of process and not to criminal cases. Commonwealth v.
Reynolds, 120 Mass. at 196. After considering the early English history, however, the Court
in Payton found that the question of whether privacy rights permitted forcible entry of homes
to arrest was unsettled at common law. 445 U.S. at 598. See a/so Smith v. United States, 254
F.2d at 761 (Bazelon, J., dissenting). Early American caselaw is inconsistent in its treatment
of a person's privacy interest in the home.
139 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
140 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
141 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
142 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. at 630.
143 Some caselaw indicates that society's value of privacy in the home diminishes when the
third party has knowledge that an arrest warrant has been issued for a suspect. Underlying
this is the notion that because a suspect is committing or has committed a crime his actual
expectation of privacy is not one which the law recognizes as legitimate. In Rakas v. Illinois,
439 U.S. 128 (1978), the Court gives the example of a burglar who may have a subjective
expectation of privacy which is not recognized or permitted by society. Similarly, in Vance v.
North Carolina, 432 F.2d 984, 991 (4th Cir. 1970), the court considered that the defendant
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The extensiveness of the search is a critical factor to examine 44 in
determining the intrusiveness of the police conduct on third party pri-
vacy rights. The search of a home under an arrest warrant for a suspect
is at best only slightly less intrusive than that conducted under the au-
thority of a search warrant for evidence. In Payton, the Court explicitly
rejected the contention that the two searches are substantially different:
[A]ny differences in the intrusiveness of entries to search and entries to
arrest are merely ones of degree rather than kind. . . . [T]he area that
may legally be searched is broader when executing a search warrant than
when executing an arrest warrant in the home. This difference may be
more theoretical than real, however, because the police may need to check
the entire premises for safety reasons, and sometimes they ignore the re-
strictions on searches incident to arrest. 1
45
However, with the plain view' 46 and search incident to arrest1 47 doc-
trines, the search of the third party's home, though not unlimited, 48
could be quite extensive. 149 The search for a suspect usually involves
"of course" knew he had violated probation and "had every reason to expect the knock on the
door. It is unlikely that he experienced any sense of outrage or indignation. . . ." Id
In United States v. Boyer, 574 F.2d 950, the court relied on similar reasoning to excuse a
failure to announce purpose in arresting a felon on an arrest warrant in a third party's home.
Noting that the requirement that officers state their purpose before entry is relaxed when the
person within already knows of the officers' authority and purpose, the court said:
[T]he knowledge of the person arrested is of greater importance than the knowledge of
other persons who may be in the residence . . . . The exceptions . . . depend on the
officer's knowledge and belief. In the case of an armed felon avoiding arrest, police could
often be sure that he knew the purpose of their entry; they would, however, have few
indices on which to determine the knowledge of third persons, if any, in the house."
Id at 954.
This kind of reasoning is extremely dangerous to fourth amendment protections because
it assumes the guilt of the suspect and, based on that assumption, diminishes the expectation
of privacy in the home. The fourth amendment "guarantee of protection against unreasona-
ble searches and seizures extends to the innocent and guilty alike." McDonald v. United
States, 335 U.S. at 453. The reasoning of such a rule overlooks the fact that more than the
suspect's privacy expectation is at stake in a third party home entry. Furthermore, it relies on
the officer's belief or suspicion about the suspect and what he believes.
To apply this argument to the third party to diminish his right to privacy in the home
when he knows of the arrest warrant is equally untenable. Just as a homeowner's knowledge
that evidence of a crime is within his home plays no role in deciding whether a search warrant
is necessary to enter the home to seize evidence, neither should the third party's knowledge
that a suspect has committed a crime be a factor in deciding whether a search warrant must
be obtained before searching for the suspect.
144 Wyman v. James, 309 U.S. at 320-22. See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 25.
145 445 U.S. at 589 (footnote omitted).
146 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
147 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20,
30 (1925).
148 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. at 763.
149 The scope of the search incident to arrest has been broadened by giving wide latitude
to officers in deciding what is within the arrestee's "immediate control." See, e.g., United
States v. Wysocki, 457 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1972); Etcheverny v. County Court of Nassau
County, 415 F. Supp. 232 (E.D.N.Y. 1976). Professor LaFave notes that the Chimel rule has
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more than a "brief and courteous walkthrough."'' 5 0 If the officer may
look anywhere the suspect might reasonably be, a very thorough search
into closets and beneath beds could be made. This type of search is
analogous in intrusiveness to a search for evidence, and may even be
more intrusive when the officer has not been limited by a search warrant
which names with particularity what or whom is to be seized.
The benefit of having a search warrant lies in the magistrate's neu-
tral determination of the necessity to enter as well as the particularity of
the search warrant. A search warrant assures the third person that a
neutral magistrate made the probable cause determinations and advises
the third party of the scope of the search.1 5 1 When not required to ob-
tain the warrant first, officers could with hindsight claim that they en-
tered searching for what they actually found after an overly-intrusive
search. When a search warrant issues, the officer is restricted to looking
for those things (or persons) named in it. The particularity of the war-
rant protects the third person from an exploratory search beyond that
necessary to find the suspect. Because the third party home search to
arrest is as intrusive as a home search for evidence, the extensiveness of
the search weighs heavily in the balance toward a prior judicial determi-
nation.
The purpose of the search and who conducts it are important in
determining the intrusiveness of the search as well. In Camara, for exam-
ple, the fact that the area inspection was not aimed at the discovery of
evidence of a crime supported a finding that the search was a limited
invasion of privacy. 152 In Wyman v.James,153 the fact that a welfare visit
was not conducted by law enforcement officers looking for criminal vio-
lations was a factor supporting the exception.
If searches of homes for administrative or inspection purposes are
reasonable without a warrant or probable cause because the Court has
construed the intrusion as relatively minor, the search of a third party's
home by police officers is more intrusive, with far-reaching ramifications
for the third party. Police conduct searches to arrest for the purpose of
criminal prosecution. Unlike the welfare recipient, 154 the third party
could, as a result of what police find in his home apart from the suspect,
be subject to criminal prosecution as well. 155 If the officers find evidence
been reluctantly applied by the courts and that there is a "tendency to view every arrestee as
a combination acrobat and Houdini who might well free himself from his restraints and sud-
denly gain access to some distant place." I W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 414 (1978).
150 Wallace v. King, 626 F.2d at 1163 (Hall, J., dissenting).
151 Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. at 323.
152 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 537.
153 400 U.S. at 321.
154 Id. at 323.
155 See, e.g., United States v. Gaultney, 606 F.2d 540; United States v. Phillips, 593 F.2d
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against the individual, the subsequent arrest infringes on the very liberty
of the individual. Were the suspect not in the third person's home, the
officers would have to have a search warrant based on probable cause to
make an intrusion on the third party's rights. To allow the third party
intrusion on the basis of an arrest warrant alone circumvents the proce-
dural protections of the fourth amendment as to the third party. The
purpose of the requirement is not to protect criminal conduct, but
rather to protect third persons from the serious intrusions which poten-
tial criminal prosecution entails by providing appropriate consideration
of the third party interests through a prior judicial determination that
the person sought is on the third person's premises.
The final interest to weigh in the balance is that of society in deter-
ring police excesses. "The [Fourth] Amendment is designed to prevent,
not simply to redress, unlawful police action."' 56 Unlike the arrest war-
rant, the search warrant places limits on when and where the officer
may search. When an officer proceeds with only an arrest warrant and
a reasonable belief, his actions are less accountable in that a neutral
judicial officer has not found probable cause that the suspect is inside.
Having to present his claim of a reasonable belief to a magistrate will
force the officer to present evidence supporting his desire to enter some-
one's home. Of course, the third party can bring a tort or civil rights
action against police officers for an alleged illegal entry.' 5 7 However,
the continuing existence of the exclusionary rule would suggest that the
courts have little confidence in the deterrent value of potential civil liti-
gation brought against the police officer.
Considering all of these factors on balance, the burden upon law
enforcement interests of requiring search and arrest warrant determina-
tions by a neutral magistrate before the entry of a third person's home is
minimal in comparison with the nature and intrusiveness of the search.
The exigent circumstances and consent exceptions to the warrant re-
quirement provide police officers with the kind of flexibility they need to
capture dangerous criminals when time is of the essence and to protect
themselves and citizens. The delay caused by getting a warrant in
553; United States v. Hammond, 585 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Harper, 550
F.2d 610 (10th Cir. 1978); United States v. James, 528 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1976); Rice v. Wolff,
513 F.2d 1280.
The third party could also be subject to prosecution for harboring a fugitive. See, e.g.,
United States v. Adams, 621 F.2d 41; United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343; Michael v.
United States, 393 F.2d 22 (5th Cir. 1968); United States v. McKinney, 379 F.2d 259.
Of course, the question also arises on the suspect's motion to suppress evidence found in
the third party's home pursuant to an arrest. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 612 F.2d
735; United States v. Cravero, 545 F.2d 406; United States v. Brown, 467 F.2d 419.
156 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. at 766.
157 See Wallace v. King, 626 F.2d 1157; Fisher v. Volz, 496 F.2d 333; Rodriguez v. Jones,
473 F.2d 599; Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197.
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nonexigent circumstances is relatively minor and is a small price to pay
to preserve an individual's historic right to privacy in the home. For
these reasons, it is not unreasonable to require police to obtain determi-
nations from a neutral magistrate as to whether there is probable cause
to believe the suspect committed the crime and that he is in the third
person's home.
While this requirement sets forth a higher standard for entry of a
third person's home to arrest than for entry of a suspect's house to arrest,
the difference in requirements will not cause suspects to hide in the third
persons' homes. In going to a third party's home a suspect will not "es-
cape the ordinary process of law" as Semaynes Case suggested years
ago.' 58 Rather, suspects against whom the proper probable cause can
be found by a magistrate will be arrested upon the proper authority.
The warrant merely formalizes and verifies the officer's reasonable be-
lief, which would be the same with or without the requirement. What
the requirement will do is lend judicial scrutiny to the officer's supposi-
tions, and provide a check against poor judgment or sham use of an
arrest warrant.'
5 9
Even though the requirements for entry to arrest in a third party's
home will not create safe harbors for suspects, there are legitimate rea-
sons to make the same requirements applicable to the suspect's own
home. First, a person's actual expectation of privacy in his own home is
no less than in a third party's home, and that expectation is one which
society should recognize as legitimate. Second, even in the entry of a
suspect's home third party privacy interests are potentially at stake.
That is, a suspect may live with a family or spouse whose privacy inter-
ests should be considered separately via a search warrant inquiry. Fi-
nally, to retain a distinction between the two types of entries would
undoubtedly lead to irresolvable questions about what constitutes a
third party. For example, is someone's roommate a third party; is the
mother of a suspect who has his own apartment a third party, etc.?
Fourth amendment rights should not turn on such subtle nuances when
what is truly at stake is the privacy of the occupants, no matter what
their relation to the suspect.
158 Semayne's Case, 11 Eng. Rul. Gas. at 635.
159 Cf Fisher v. Volz, 496 F.2d at 341:
A requirement that the officer must also have probable cause to believe that the suspect
is in the dwelling will not unduly restrict the effectiveness of police action but will reduce
the obvious risks of abuse. It offers police considerable latitude but also requires a neces-
sary amount of restraint. It should enable police to act reasonably, but not oppressively
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IV. CONCLUSION
In order to realize the framers' special place for the privacy of the
home in fourth amendment law, police entry of a third party home in
nonexigent circumstances must be accompanied by a magistrate's deter-
mination of the questions involved in issuing a search and arrest war-
rant. That is, the magistrate must decide whether there is probable
cause to believe this suspect committed a crime and that he is on the
third person's premises. To protect the third parties' privacy interests
and the purposes of requiring such a warrant determination, the exigent
circumstances which would justify an entry without these prior determi-
nations must be narrowly defined. A rule vesting in the magistrate the
determination to enter will promote the basic purpose of the fourth
amendment to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against
arbitrary invasions by government officials. 6°
LINDA IMES
160 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 528.
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